Published 2001
| public
Book Section - Chapter
Markets for contracts: experiments exploring the compatibility of games and markets for games
- Creators
- Plott, Charles R.
- Williamson, Dean V.
- Others:
- Cason, Timothy
- Noussair, Charles
Abstract
The research explores the relationship between games and the economic environment in which the games might be embedded. The focus is on a market institution in which agents buy and sell rights to participate in a follow on stage of strategic interaction. The central question posed concems how two different types of processes, the game and the market, interact. The market converges to a competitive equilibrium that is consistent with the Nash equilibrium that obtains in the game, and the convergence of the market to a competitive equilibrium lags the convergence of behaviors in the game to a Nash equilibrium.
Additional Information
© 2001 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 103150
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20200512-135143597
- Created
-
2020-05-12Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2021-11-16Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Series Name
- Studies in Economic Theory
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 15