Published November 2000
| public
Journal Article
Markets for contracts: experiments exploring the compatibility of games and markets for games
- Creators
-
Plott, Charles R.
- Williamson, Dean V.
Abstract
The research explores the relationship between games and the economic environment in which the games might be embedded. The focus is on a market institution in which agents buy and sell rights to participate in the follow-on stage of strategic interaction. The central question posed concerns how two different types of processes, the game and the market, interact. The market converges to a competitive equilibrium that is consistent with the Nash equilibrium that obtains in the game, and the convergence of the market to a competitive equilibrium lags the convergence of behaviors in the game to the Nash equilibrium.
Additional Information
© 2000 Springer-Verlag. Received: April 19, 1999; revised version: 24 July, 1999. We thank Tim Cason and an anonymous referee for thoughtful comments and suggestions. We conducted the research with support from the National Science Foundation and the Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Political Science.Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 43951
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20140224-140218171
- NSF
- Caltech Laboratory of Experimental Economics and Political Science
- Created
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2014-02-24Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2021-11-10Created from EPrint's last_modified field