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Published December 1998 | public
Journal Article

Repeated Implementation

Abstract

In the traditional static implementation literature it is often impossible for implementors to enforce their optimal outcomes. And when restricting the choice to dominant-strategy implementation, only the dictatorial choices of one of the participants are implementable. Repeated implementation problems are drastically different. This paper provides a strong implementation "folk theorem:" for patient implementors, every outcome function they care about is dominant-strategy implementable.

Additional Information

© 1998 by Academic Press. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved. Received December 18, 1997; revised June 15, 1998. The authors thank Andreas Blume, Tim Feddersen, Alvaro Sandroni, and a referee of this journal for helpful suggestions. Kalai's research is partly supported by NSF Economics Grant SBR-955421. Ledyard's research is partly supported by the New Millenium Project Office of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory of NASA. Formerly SSWP 1027.

Additional details

Created:
August 19, 2023
Modified:
October 17, 2023