Published December 1998
| public
Journal Article
Repeated Implementation
- Creators
- Kalai, Ehud
- Ledyard, John O.
Chicago
An error occurred while generating the citation.
Abstract
In the traditional static implementation literature it is often impossible for implementors to enforce their optimal outcomes. And when restricting the choice to dominant-strategy implementation, only the dictatorial choices of one of the participants are implementable. Repeated implementation problems are drastically different. This paper provides a strong implementation "folk theorem:" for patient implementors, every outcome function they care about is dominant-strategy implementable.
Additional Information
© 1998 by Academic Press. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved. Received December 18, 1997; revised June 15, 1998. The authors thank Andreas Blume, Tim Feddersen, Alvaro Sandroni, and a referee of this journal for helpful suggestions. Kalai's research is partly supported by NSF Economics Grant SBR-955421. Ledyard's research is partly supported by the New Millenium Project Office of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory of NASA. Formerly SSWP 1027.Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 83009
- DOI
- 10.1006/jeth.1997.2459
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20171106-161520759
- NSF
- SBR-955421
- New Millenium Project Office of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory of NASA
- Created
-
2017-11-07Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2021-11-15Created from EPrint's last_modified field