Published August 11, 2017
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Repeated Implementation
- Creators
- Kalai, Ehud
- Ledyard, John O.
Abstract
In the traditional static implementation literature it is often impossible for implementors to enforce their optimal outcomes. And when restricting the choice to dominant-strategy implementation, only the dictatorial choices of one of the participants are implementable. Repeated implementation problems are drastically different. This paper provides a strong implementation "folk theorem": for patient implementors, every outcome function they care about is dominant-strategy implementable.
Additional Information
Revised version. Original dated to August 1996. The authors wish to thank Andreas Blume, Tim Feddersen, Alvaro Sandroni, and a referee of JEL for helpful suggestions. Kalai's research is partly supported by NSF Economics Grant No. SBR-955421. Ledyard's research is partly supported by the New Millennium Project Office of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory of NASA. Published as Kalai, E., & Ledyard, J.O. (1998). Repeated implementation. Journal of Economic Theory, 83(2), 308-317.Attached Files
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 80328
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170811-163520727
- SBR-955421
- NSF
- New Millennium Project Office, JPL
- Created
-
2017-08-11Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 1027