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Published September 2007 | public
Journal Article

Group play in games and the role of consent in network formation

Abstract

We study games played between groups of players, where a given group decides which strategy it will play through a vote by its members. When groups consist of two voting players, our games can also be interpreted as network-formation games. In experiments on Stag Hunt games, we find a stark contrast between how groups and individuals play, with payoffs playing a primary role in equilibrium selection when individuals play, but the structure of the voting rule playing the primary role when groups play. We develop a new solution concept, robust-belief equilibrium, which explains the data that we observe. We provide results showing that this solution concept has application beyond the particular games in our experiments. © 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Additional Information

© 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. Received 20 March 2006; final version received 7 September 2006; Available online 11 December 2006. Formerly SSWP 1193.

Additional details

Created:
August 22, 2023
Modified:
October 17, 2023