Group Play in Games and the Role of Consent in Network Formation
- Creators
- Charness, Gary
- Jackson, Matthew O.
Abstract
We study games played between groups of players, where a given group decides which strategy it will play through a vote by its members. When groups consist of two voting players, our games can also be interpreted as network-formation games. In experiments on Stag Hunt games, we find that that the structure of the voting rule completely determines which equilibrium is played, independently of the payoff structure. Thus, we find a stark contrast between how groups and individuals play our games, with payoffs playing a much more important role in equilibrium selection in the latter case. We also explore play between groups where one member of each group dictates the play of that group. We find that the dictator tends to play a less risky strategy when choosing for a group than when playing only for him or herself. We develop a new solution concept, robust-belief equilibrium, which explains the data that we observe. We provide results showing that this solution concept has application beyond the particular games in our experiments.
Additional Information
Financial support from the Lee Center for Advanced Networking is gratefully acknowledged. Published as Charness, G., & Jackson, M.O. (2007). Group play in games and the role of consent in network formation. Journal of Economic Theory, 136(1), 417-445.Attached Files
Published - sswp1193.pdf
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 79613
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170731-141927016
- Caltech Lee Center for Advanced Networking
- Created
-
2017-08-01Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 1193