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Published September 19, 2017 | Submitted
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Generalized Symmetry Conditions at a Core Point

Abstract

Previous analyses have shown that if a point x is to be a core of a majority rule voting game in Euclidean space, when preferences are smooth, then the utility gradients must satisfy certain restrictive symmetry conditions. In this paper these results are generalized to the case of an arbitrary voting rule, and necessary and sufficient conditions, expressed in terms of "pivotal" coalitions, are obtained.

Additional Information

Revised. Original dated to January 1985. The contribution of the first author is supported, in part, by NSF grant SES-84-09654 to the California Institute of Technology, and that of the second author is based on work supported by NSF grant SES-84-18295 to the School of Social Sciences, University of California at Irvine. We are grateful to Charles Plott and Jeff Strnad for a number of helpful observations. Published as McKelvey, Richard D., and Norman Schofield. "Generalized symmetry conditions at a core point." Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society (1987): 923-933.

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Created:
August 19, 2023
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January 14, 2024