Published July 1987
| Published
Journal Article
Open
Generalized symmetry conditions at a core point
- Creators
- McKelvey, Richard D.
- Schofield, Norman
Abstract
Previous analyses have shown that if a point is to be a core of a majority rule voting game in Euclidean space, when preferences are smooth, then the utility gradients at the point must satisfy certain restrictive symmetry conditions. In this paper, these results are generalized to the case of an arbitrary voting rule, and necessary and sufficient conditions, expressed in terms of the utility gradients of "pivotal" coalitions, are obtained.
Additional Information
© 1987 The Econometric Society. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Weingart Conference on Formal Models of Voting, March 22-23, 1985, California Institute of Technology. The contribution of the first author is supported, in part, by NSF Grant SES-84-09654 to the California Institute of Technology, and that of the second author is based on work supported by NSF Grant SES-84-18295 to the School of Social Sciences, University of California at Irvine. We are grateful to David Austen-Smith, Charles Plott, and Jeff Strand for a number of helpful observations. Formerly SSWP 552.Attached Files
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 83177
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20171113-161716689
- SES-8409654
- NSF
- SES-8418295
- NSF
- Created
-
2017-11-15Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2021-11-15Created from EPrint's last_modified field