Published March 1986
| Submitted
Discussion Paper
Open
An Experimental Analysis of Public Goods Provision Mechanisms with and without Unanimity
Chicago
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Abstract
The paper reports on an experimental investigation of four methods of allocating public goods. The two basic processes studied are direct contribution and a public goods auction process. Both of these processes are studied with and without an additional unanimity feature. The results suggest that the auction process outperforms direct contribution. The effect of unanimity is to decrease the efficiency of both processes. Much of the paper is focused on an analysis of these results.
Additional Information
Funding provided by the National Science Foundation and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is gratefully acknowledged. The comments of Mark Olson (JPL) on the statistical analysis and his computer programming assistance are both acknowledged. Published as Banks, Jeffrey S. and Plott, Charles R. and Porter, David P. (1988) An Experimental Analysis of Unanimity in Public Goods Provision Mechanisms. Review of Economic Studies, 55 (2). pp. 301-322.Attached Files
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 81448
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170914-133142840
- NSF
- NASA
- Created
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2017-09-15Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 595