Published April 1988
| public
Journal Article
An Experimental Analysis of Unanimity in Public Goods Provision Mechanisms
Abstract
The paper reports on an experimental investigation of four methods of allocating public goods. The two basic processes studied are direct contribution and a public goods auction process. Both of these processes are studied with and without an additional unanimity feature. The results suggest that the auction process outperforms direct contribution. The effect of unanimity is to decrease the efficiency of both processes. Much of the paper is focused on an analysis of these results.
Additional Information
© 1988 The Society for Economic Analysis Limited. Funding provided by the National Science Foundation and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is gratefully acknowledged. We are indebted to John Ledyard for his helpful comments and suggestions. The comments of Mark Olson (JPL) on the statistical analysis and his computer programming assistance are acknowledged.Additional details
- Alternative title
- An experimental analysis of public goods provision mechanisms with and without unanimity
- Eprint ID
- 44477
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20140324-145338589
- NSF
- NASA
- Created
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2014-04-01Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2021-11-10Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Other Numbering System Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Other Numbering System Identifier
- 595