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Published March 22, 2016 | Accepted Version
Report Open

The Core Matchings of Markets with Transfers

Abstract

We characterize the structure of the set of core matchings of an assignment game (a two-sided market with transfers). Such a set satisfies a property we call consistency. Consistency of a set of matchings states that, for any matching v, if, for each agent i there exists a matching μ in the set for which μ(i) = v(i), then v is in the set. A set of matchings satisfies consistency if and only if there is an assignment game for which all elements of the set maximize the surplus. We also identify conditions under which we can assume the assignment game has nonnegative values.

Additional Information

October 2008. We are grateful to Kim Border for explaining the integer/real version of Farkas' Lemma, and to Haluk Ergin for his detailed comments. We also thank Guilherme de Freitas and Sang Mok Lee for excellent research assistance. Our research was supported by the National Science Foundation through grant SES-0751980.

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Created:
August 19, 2023
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January 13, 2024