Published October 2008
| Accepted Version
Working Paper
Open
The Core Matchings of Markets with Transfers
Chicago
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Abstract
We characterize the structure of the set of core matchings of an assignment game (a two-sided market with transfers). Such a set satisfies a property we call consistency. Consistency of a set of matchings states that, for any matching v, if, for each agent i there exists a matching μ in the set for which μ(i) = v(i), then v is in the set. A set of matchings satisfies consistency if and only if there is an assignment game for which all elements of the set maximize the surplus. We also identify conditions under which we can assume the assignment game has nonnegative values.
Additional Information
October 2008. We are grateful to Kim Border for explaining the integer/real version of Farkas' Lemma, and to Haluk Ergin for his detailed comments. We also thank Guilherme de Freitas and Sang Mok Lee for excellent research assistance. Our research was supported by the National Science Foundation through grant SES-0751980.Attached Files
Accepted Version - sswp1298.pdf
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 65554
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20160321-141503758
- NSF
- SES-0751980
- Created
-
2016-03-22Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2020-03-09Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 1298