Published February 2015
| Submitted + Published
Journal Article
Open
The Core Matchings of Markets with Transfers
Abstract
We characterize the structure of the set of core matchings of an assignment game (a two-sided market with transfers). Such a set satisfies a property we call consistency. Consistency of a set of matchings states that, for any matching v, if, for each agent i there exists a matching μ in the set for which μ(i) = v(i), then v is in the set. A set of matchings satisfies consistency if and only if there is an assignment game for which all elements of the set maximize the surplus.
Additional Information
© 2015 American Economic Association. We are grateful to Kim Border for explaining the integer/real version of Farkas' Lemma, and to Haluk Ergin for his detailed comments. We also thank Guilherme de Freitas and Sang Mok Lee for excellent research assistance, and two anonymous referees for advice on revising our paper for the journal. Our research was supported by the National Science Foundation through grant SES-0751980.Attached Files
Published - mic.20130089.pdf
Submitted - assignment.pdf
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assignment.pdf
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 20355
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20101008-104911510
- SES-0751980
- NSF
- Created
-
2010-10-08Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2021-11-08Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Other Numbering System Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Other Numbering System Identifier
- 1298