Published February 1979
| public
Journal Article
Cyclic sets in multidimensional voting models
- Creators
- Cohen, Linda
Chicago
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Abstract
Simple majority rule usually does not yield an unambiguous consistent outcome. Assuming a characterization of the set of potential outcomes as R^n and an odd number of voters with quasi-concave preferences, a unique, nonempty set of majority rule cycles exists. Sufficient conditions are established for the top cycle set to encompass the entire policy space. Generalized quadratic utility functions satisfy these conditions.
Additional Information
© 1979 by Academic Press, Inc. Received March 22, 1977; revised June 2, 1978. I wish to thank John Ferejohn and my colleagues in the 1977 California Institute of Technology Social Science workshop. I especially thank Charles Plott and Richard McKelvey for commenting on earlier versions. Formerly SSWP 172.Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 83411
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20171121-152137219
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2017-11-22Created from EPrint's datestamp field
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2021-11-15Created from EPrint's last_modified field