Published October 24, 2017
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Cyclic Sets in Multidimensional Voting Models
- Creators
- Cohen, Linda
Abstract
Simple majority rule usually does not yield an unambiguous consistent outcome. Assuming a characterization of the set of potential outcomes as R^n and an odd number of voters with quasi-concave preferences, a unique, nonempty set of majority rule cycles exists. Sufficient conditions are established for the top cycle set to encompass the entire policy space. Generalized quadratic utility functions satisfy these conditions
Additional Information
Second revision. I wish to thank John Ferejohn and my collegues in the 1977 Social Science workshop. I especially thank Charles Plott and Richard McKelvey for commenting on earlier versions. McKelvey's paper came to my attention after the completion of the original version of this paper. His method of proof and some of his results are similar to those of this paper. The paper by myself and Steven Matthews was written after this paper was submitted for publication. It contains an extension of the results presented here. Published as Cohen, Linda. "Cyclic sets in multidimensional voting models." Journal of Economic Theory 20.1 (1979): 1-12.Attached Files
Submitted - sswp172_-_revised.pdf
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 82633
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20171024-152758742
- Created
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2017-10-24Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 172