Published 2007
| Published
Journal Article
Open
Resource allocation with spatial externalities: Experiments on land consolidation
- Creators
- Tanaka, Tomomi
Abstract
This paper compares the performance of a two-sided combinatorial call market, direct negotiation, and double auction for consolidating fragmented land. Experimental results suggest direct negotiation produces higher efficiencies than other mechanisms. The combinatorial call market tends to alleviate the exposure problem, and performs well when 1) swapping is easily agreeable, and 2) the number of subjects and commodities are increased and the initial endowments are unchallenging. The two-sided combinatorial call market, however, suffers from the holdout problem when the number of subjects and commodities is small.
Additional Information
Copyright ©2007 The Berkeley Electronic Press. Submitted: May 19, 2006. Accepted: December 4, 2006. Published: January 23, 2007. I thank Colin Camerer, Sang Hyop Lee, Jim Roumasset, Jim Richardson for helpful comments. I am indebted to Katerina Sherstyuk and John Ledyard for their guidance throughout the course of this research. Financial supports were provided by the Caltech Social Science Experimental Laboratory and the University of Hawaii Experimental Laboratory.Attached Files
Published - TANbejeap07.pdf
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 11571
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:TANbejeap07
- Caltech Social Science Experimental Laboratory
- University of Hawaii Experimental Laboratory
- Created
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2008-09-07Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field