Published July 10, 2000
| public
Journal Article
Open
Simple Proof of Security of the BB84 Quantum Key Distribution Protocol
- Creators
- Shor, Peter W.
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Preskill, John
Chicago
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Abstract
We prove that the 1984 protocol of Bennett and Brassard (BB84) for quantum key distribution is secure. We first give a key distribution protocol based on entanglement purification, which can be proven secure using methods from Lo and Chau's proof of security for a similar protocol. We then show that the security of this protocol implies the security of BB84. The entanglement purification based protocol uses Calderbank-Shor-Steane codes, and properties of these codes are used to remove the use of quantum computation from the Lo-Chau protocol.
Additional Information
©2000 The American Physical Society Received 28 February 2000 The authors thank Michael Ben-Or, Eli Biham, Hoi-Kwong Lo, Dominic Mayers, and Tal Mor for explanations of and informative discussions about their security proofs. We also thank Ike Chuang, Daniel Gottesman, Alexei Kitaev, and Michael Nielsen for their discussions and suggestions, which greatly improved this paper. Part of this research was done while P.W. S. was visiting Caltech. This work has been supported in part by the Department of Energy under Grant No. DE-FG03-92-ER40701, and by DARPA through Caltech's Quantum Information and Computation (QUIC) project administered by the Army Research Office.Files
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 2745
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:SHOprl00
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2006-04-25Created from EPrint's datestamp field
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2021-11-08Created from EPrint's last_modified field