Published December 2007
| Published
Journal Article
Open
Phenomenology without conscious access is a form of consciousness without top-down attention
- Creators
-
Koch, Christof
- Tsuchiya, Naotsugu
Abstract
We agree with Block's basic hypothesis postulating the existence of phenomenal consciousness without cognitive access. We explain such states in terms of consciousness without top-down, endogenous attention and speculate that their correlates may be a coalition of neurons that are consigned to the back of cortex, without access to working memory and planning in frontal cortex.
Additional Information
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2007. Reprinted with permission. Published online by Cambridge University Press 27 March 2008. Open Peer Commentary on Ned Block, Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 30, pp 481-499, December 2008.Attached Files
Published - KOCbbs08.pdf
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KOCbbs08.pdf
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 12015
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:KOCbbs07
- Created
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2008-10-20Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2021-11-08Created from EPrint's last_modified field