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Published January 2005 | Submitted + Published
Journal Article Open

Existence of equilibrium in single and double private value auctions

Abstract

We show existence of equilibria in distributional strategies for a wide class of private value auctions, including the first general existence result for double auctions. The set of equilibria is invariant to the tie-breaking rule. The model incorporates multiple unit demands, all standard pricing rules, reserve prices, entry costs, and stochastic demand and supply. Valuations can be correlated and asymmetrically distributed. For double auctions, we show further that at least one equilibrium involves a positive volume of trade. The existence proof establishes new connections among existence techniques for discontinuous Bayesian games.

Additional Information

©2005 Econometric Society. Manuscript received November, 2001; final revision received April, 2004. We thank Leo Simon, Bill Zame, Mark Satterthwaite, and Phil Reny for helpful conversations. We also thank Kim Border, Martin Cripps, John Nachbar, Larry Samuelson, Tianxiang Ye, three anonymous referees, and the editor for helpful comments and suggestions. Financial support from the National Science Foundation under Grant SES-9986190 and from the Boeing Center for Technology and Information Management is gratefully acknowledged.

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Created:
August 22, 2023
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October 16, 2023