Published February 2006
| public
Journal Article
Open
Judicial lobbying: The politics of labor law constitutional interpretation
Chicago
Abstract
This paper links the theory of interest groups influence over the legislature with that of congressional control over the judiciary. The resulting framework reconciles the theoretical literature of lobbying with the negative available evidence on the impact of lobbying over legislative outcomes, and sheds light to the determinants of lobbying in separation-of-powers systems. We provide conditions for judicial decisions to be sensitive to legislative lobbying, and find that lobbying falls the more divided the legislature is on the relevant issues. We apply this framework to analyze supreme court labor decisions in Argentina, and find results consistent with the predictions of the theory.
Additional Information
Copyright © 2006 by the American Political Science Association. We would like to thank Andy Atkeson, Juliana Bambaci, Rui de Figueiredo, Christian Hellwig, David K. Levine, Leeat Yariv, and seminar participants at MPSA, UCLA, and Berkeley for helpful comments.Files
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 5920
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:IARapsr06
- Created
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2006-11-08Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2021-11-08Created from EPrint's last_modified field