Published February 2007
| Published
Journal Article
Open
Monopoly quality degradation and regulation in cable television
- Creators
- Crawford, Gregory S.
-
Shum, Matthew
Abstract
Using an empirical framework based on the Mussa-Rosen model of monopoly quality choice, we calculate the degree of quality degradation in cable television markets and the impact of regulation on those choices. We find lower bounds of quality degradation ranging from 11 to 45 percent of offered service qualities. Furthermore, cable operators in markets with local regulatory oversight offer significantly higher quality, less degradation, and greater quality per dollar, despite higher prices.
Additional Information
© 2007 The University of Chicago. We would like to thank Gary Biglaiser, Silke Januszewski, Eugenio Miravete, and seminar participants at Northwestern University, the University of California, Los Angeles, the National Bureau of Economic Research 2002 winter program meeting, the Society for Economic Dynamics 2002 meeting, the 2004 Kiel-Munich Workshop on Network Industries, and the 2004 Centre for Economic Policy Research conference Competition in the New Economy for helpful comments.Attached Files
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 12162
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:CRAjle07
- Created
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2008-10-28Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2021-11-08Created from EPrint's last_modified field