What's Wrong with Neuron Diagrams?

Abstract

In this essay, I examine a particular mode of representation that has become prevalent within philosophy—the use of "neuron diagrams" to represent systems of causal relations.1 Neuron diagrams were first introduced by David Lewis in 1986 (Lewis 1986, pp. 196–210). They have spread, both through the direct influence of this work, and indirectly through the work of his many talented students, who learned of them in the classrooms and common rooms of Princeton. Neuron diagrams have now become a kind of lingua franca for discussion about causation, especially among those interested in Lewis's counterfactual theories of causation, and more recent refinements thereof. They appear not only in the published literature, but on blackboards and white boards; they are projected from slides and laptops, and are scribbled on napkins in bars and coffee shops. In short, they are bound to appear wherever causation is discussed.

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