Published March 12, 2022
| Submitted
Discussion Paper
Open
Efficiency in Random Resource Allocation and Social Choice
Chicago
An error occurred while generating the citation.
Abstract
We study efficiency in general collective choice problems when agents have ordinal preferences and randomization is allowed. We establish the equivalence between welfare maximization and ex-ante efficiency for general domains. We relate ex-ante efficiency with ex-post efficiency, characterizing when the two notions coincide. Our results have implications for well-studied mechanisms including random serial dictatorship and a number of specific environments, including the dichotomous, single-peaked, and social choice domains.
Additional Information
We are grateful to (in alphabetic order) Anna Bogomolnaia, Ron Holzman, Hervé Moulin, Luciano Pomatto, and Omer Tamuz for discussions that inspired this work, and the Linde Institute at Caltech for its financial support. Federico Echenique thanks the National Science Foundation for its support through the grants SES 1558757 and CNS 1518941. Joseph Root was partially supported by PIMCO. Fedor Sandomirskiy was partially supported by the National Science Foundation (grant CNS 1518941) and the HSE University Basic Research Program.Attached Files
Submitted - 2203.06353.pdf
Files
2203.06353.pdf
Files
(338.2 kB)
| Name | Size | Download all |
|---|---|---|
|
md5:8b853356af36965cd0347ead7be6a701
|
338.2 kB | Preview Download |
Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 115382
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20220707-170628097
- Linde Institute of Economic and Management Science
- NSF
- SES-1558757
- NSF
- CNS-1518941
- PIMCO
- HSE University
- Created
-
2022-07-08Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2023-06-02Created from EPrint's last_modified field