The (Un)intended Consequences of M&A Regulatory Enforcements
Abstract
Economic and policy uncertainty affect merger and acquisition (M&A) activity. In this paper, we use Department of Justice (DOJ) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) interventions in the M&A market to investigate whether uncertainty around regulatory enforcements also matters. Our results support this conjecture. Using the Hoberg and Phillips (2010) similarity scores to identify product market competitors, we confirm a clear and significant DOJ/FTC regulatory enforcements' deterrence effect on future M&A transaction attempts, a result robust to many alternative specifications and confirmed in additional tests. This deterrence effect is (at least partly) driven by the length of the regulatory process, a factor that exacerbates enforcement uncertainty. Our results identify an (un)intended channel through which M&A regulation hampers efficient resources allocation.
Additional Information
Acknowledgments: We are grateful to Gregory Eaton, Feng Guo, and Tingting Liu for giving us access to their hand-gathered sample of valuation peers (from Eaton, Guo, Liu, and Officer, 2021).Attached Files
Submitted - The__Un_intended_Consequences_of_M_A_Regulatory_Enforcements.pdf
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 114352
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20220415-220320274
- Created
-
2022-04-15Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2022-04-15Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 1462