Gender heterogeneity of bureaucrats in attitude to corruption: Evidence from list experiment
Abstract
A high level of corruption usually constrains economic development in emerging countries. However, anti-corruption campaigns often fail because the relevant policies need to be implemented by existing corrupt governments. This article studies the extent of bureaucrats' heterogeneity in attitude to the problem of corruption. Due to the sensitivity of direct questions on corruption, we conduct the list experiment among public procurement officials in Russia. We show that female bureaucrats consider corruption an obstacle to public procurement development, and find no such evidence for male bureaucrats. This heterogeneity holds even at the high-level occupied positions. Although the negative attitude to corruption does not necessarily imply the anti-corruption activity by women, recognition of the problem seems to be a prerequisite for supporting an anti-corruption policy.
Additional Information
© 2021 Elsevier. Received 1 October 2020, Revised 20 May 2021, Accepted 20 June 2021, Available online 14 July 2021. The study was implemented in the framework of the Basic Research Program at the National Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE University) in 2019. The authors are grateful to Alexander Kalgin, members of EACES-HSE workshop 'Topics in Political Economy of Development,' and the two anonymous referees. We are also grateful to all respondents who spent their time on participating in the survey. All mistakes remain our own. CRediT authorship contribution statement. Polina Detkova: Formal analysis, Investigation, Writing – original draft, Writing – review & editing. Andrey Tkachenko: Data curation, Methodology, Writing – original draft, Writing – review & editing. Andrei Yakovlev: Conceptualization, Project administration, Writing – original draft, Writing – review & editing. Declaration of Competing Interest. All authors have approved the final article.Attached Files
Submitted - SSRN-id3789608.pdf
Supplemental Material - 1-s2.0-S0167268121002730-mmc1.pdf
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 110779
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20210908-171135415
- National Research University Higher School of Economics
- Created
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2021-09-08Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2021-09-08Created from EPrint's last_modified field