Decentralization, Repression, and Gambling for Unity

Abstract

I study a dynamic model of center-periphery relations that endogenizes the periphery's grievance via the legacy of repression. The center's key trade-off is that repression prevents the periphery from mobilizing today but increases grievances and thus the group's ability to mobilize tomorrow, whereas tolerating mobilization diminishes grievances. The model's predictions are path dependent, and a tipping point emerges among grievances. Below, the center tolerates mobilization, dissipating grievances. Above, the center preempts mobilization with perpetual repression or by granting independence, either intensifying grievances or breaking up the country, respectively. Only moderately aggrieved minorities have the opportunity and desire for mobilization. The model reconciles competing accounts of decentralization and secessionist mobilization, as the two have a nonmonotonic relationship; moderate decentralization levels are particularly susceptible to mobilization. Even decentralization optimally chosen by the center can be followed by outbursts of rebellion. The evolution of Basque secessionism helps to illustrate the model's dynamics.

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