Published November 2020
| Submitted + Supplemental Material + Published
Journal Article
Open
Sequential Information Design
- Creators
- Doval, Laura
- Ely, Jeffrey C.
Abstract
We study games of incomplete information as both the information structure and the extensive form vary. An analyst may know the payoff‐relevant data but not the players' private information, nor the extensive form that governs their play. Alternatively, a designer may be able to build a mechanism from these ingredients. We characterize all outcomes that can arise in an equilibrium of some extensive form with some information structure. We show how to specialize our main concept to capture the additional restrictions implied by extensive‐form refinements.
Additional Information
© 2020 The Econometric Society. Manuscript received 26 April, 2019; final version accepted 12 May, 2020; available online 12 May, 2020. This research is supported by grants from the National Science Foundation. The second author thanks the Einaudi Institute of Economics and Finance (EIEF) for its hospitality. We thank four anonymous referees for feedback that has greatly improved this paper. We also thank Ricardo Alonso, Andreas Blume, Gabriel Carroll, Marciano Siniscalchi, George Mailath, Ludovic Renou, Jesse Shapiro, and Ali Hortaçsu. Wade Hann-Caruthers was an outstanding research assistant. When revising this paper in December 2019, we discovered that the name of our concept, coordinated equilibrium, was also previously used in Salcedo (2012), an early version of Salcedo (2017).Attached Files
Published - ECTA17260.pdf
Submitted - sequential-information-design.pdf
Supplemental Material - ecta200188-sup-0001-onlineappendix.pdf
Files
ecta200188-sup-0001-onlineappendix.pdf
Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 107148
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20201217-101101292
- NSF
- Created
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2020-12-17Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2021-11-16Created from EPrint's last_modified field