General Equilibrium Methodology Applied to the Design, Implementation and Performance Evaluation of Large, Multi-Market and Multi-Unit Policy Constrained Auctions
Abstract
The paper reports on the methodology, design and outcome of a large auction with multiple, interdependent markets constructed from principles of general equilibrium as opposed to game theoretic auction theory. It distributed 18,788 entitlements to operate electronic gaming machines in 176 interconnected markets to 363 potential buyers representing gaming establishments subject to multiple policy constraints on the allocation. The multi-round auction, conducted in one day, produced over $600M in revenue. All policy constraints were satisfied. Revealed dynamics of interim allocations and new statistical tests provide evidence of multiple market convergence hypothesized by classical theories of general equilibrium. Results support the use of computer supported, "tâtonnement–like" market adjustments as a reliable empirical processes and not as purely theoretical constructs.
Additional Information
The financial support for analyzing the data and developing this report provided to Plott by the Rising Tide Foundation (Grant Number: RTF-19-500) and the John Templeton Foundation (Grant Number: 58067) are gratefully acknowledged as is the technical support of the Caltech Laboratory for Experimental Economic and Political Science. Limited data analysis for scientific purposes was allowed by the Victorian government. The cooperation and help of William Stevenson of Intelligent Market Systems LLC were fundamental.Attached Files
Accepted Version - sswp1447.pdf
Updated - sswp1447_revJAN2022.pdf
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 99381
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20191018-170008373
- RTF-19-500
- Rising Tide Foundation
- 58067
- John Templeton Foundation
- Created
-
2019-10-19Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2022-07-27Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 1447