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Published September 2009 | Published + Accepted Version
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A Correction and Re-Examination of "Stationary Concepts for Experimental 2 x 2 Games"

Abstract

Reinhard Selten and Thorsten Chmura (2008) recently reported laboratory results for completely mixed 2 x 2 games used to compare Nash equilibrium with four other stationary concepts: quantal response equilibrium, action-sampling equilibrium, payoff-sampling equilibrium, and impulse balance equilibrium. We reanalyze their data, correct some errors, and find that Nash clearly fits worst while the four other concepts perform about equally well. We also report new analysis of other previous experiments that illustrate the importance of the loss aversion hardwired into impulse balance equilibrium: when the other non-Nash concepts are augmented with loss aversion, they outperform impulse balance equilibrium.

Additional Information

We would like to thank participants at the Economic Science Association meetings in Tucson (November, 2008) for valuable feedback. We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the National Science Foundation (SES 0551014), the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation, and the European Research Council (ERC Advanced grant, ESEI-249433).

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Accepted Version - ssrn-id1688964_1_.pdf

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Created:
August 19, 2023
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