Published October 18, 2019
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A Testbed Experiment of a (Smart) Marked Based, Student Transportation Policy: Non Convexities, Coordination, Non Existence
Abstract
The paper develops and studies a decentralized mechanism for pricing and allocation challenges typically met with administrative processes. Traditional forms of markets are not used due to conditions associated with market failure, such as complex coordination problems, thin markets, non-convexities including and zero marginal cost due to lumpy transportation capacities. The mechanism rests on an assignment process that is guided by a computational process, enforces rules and channels information feedback to participants. Special, testbed experimental methods produce high levels of efficiency when confronted by individual behaviors that are consistent with traditional models of strategic behavior.
Additional Information
The research support of the John Templeton Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. The policy insights of Gary Stoneham of the Center for Market Design at Melbourne University were important for structuring the research, parameter development and location for a possible field trial. The authors thank him for his help, which was a central part of the research. While the focus of this paper is on the mechanism and related technical aspects, the structure has been substantially influenced by the facts and policy insights of the Center for Market Design and the support provided by the Australian National Disabilities Insurance Scheme. The insights and cooperation of the schools under consideration for a pilot experiment are gratefully appreciated in addition to the school administrators, parents and firms in the local transportation industry.Attached Files
Accepted Version - sswp1432.pdf
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 99356
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20191018-094922719
- John Templeton Foundation
- Created
-
2019-10-18Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2020-03-09Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 1432