Membership in Citizen Groups
- Creators
- Barbieri, Stefano
- Mattozzi, Andrea
Abstract
We address the coordination problem of individuals deciding to join an association that provides a public good and selective benefits to its members, when ability of the association to fulfill its purposes depends on membership size. In a global game formulation, we show that a unique equilibrium with non-trivial membership exists, and we perform meaningful comparative statics. A unique equilibrium also obtains when agents are heterogeneous, and we show that heterogeneity decreases membership size. In a two-period setting, where seniority of membership entails additional benefits, we provide conditions for uniqueness of equilibrium, and show that the presence of seniority benefits increases membership in both periods.
Additional Information
We would like to thank Andrew Postlewaite, Steven Matthews, Stephen Morris, George Mailath, Antonio Merlo, Julio Davila, Francis Bloch and Celso Brunetti. All usual disclaimers apply.Attached Files
Accepted Version - sswp1206.pdf
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 95034
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20190426-141140646
- Created
-
2019-04-26Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 1206