Fully device independent quantum key distribution
- Creators
- Vazirani, Umesh
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Vidick, Thomas
Abstract
Quantum cryptography promises levels of security that are impossible to attain in a classical world. Can this security be guaranteed to classical users of a quantum protocol, who may not even trust the quantum devices used to implement the protocol? This central question dates back to the early 1990s when the challenge of achieving Device-Independent Quantum Key Distribution (DIQKD) was first formulated. We answer the challenge by rigorously proving the device-independent security of an entanglement-based protocol building on Ekert's original proposal for quantum key distribution. The proof of security builds on techniques from the classical theory of pseudo-randomness to achieve a new quantitative understanding of the non-local nature of quantum correlations.
Additional Information
© 2019 ACM, Inc. We thank the Communications editors and Gilles Brassard for useful feedback on an earlier version of this article. Umesh Vazirani is supported by NSF Grant CCF-1410022, MURI Grant FA9550-18-1-0161 and a Vannevar Bush Faculty Fellowship. Thomas Vidick is supported by AFOSR YIP award number FA9550-16-1-0495, MURI Grant FA9550-18-1-0161, and a CIFAR Azrieli Global Scholar award. A technical version of this paper was published in Physical Review Letters, Sept. 29, 2014.Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 94030
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20190321-152633091
- NSF
- CCF-1410022
- Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR)
- FA9550-18-1-0161
- Vannever Bush Faculty Fellowship
- Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR)
- FA9550-16-1-0495
- Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR)
- Created
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2019-03-21Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2021-11-16Created from EPrint's last_modified field