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Published March 2011 | public
Journal Article

Beating the best Nash without regret

Abstract

Nash equilibrium analysis has become the de facto solution standard in game theory. This approach, despite its prominent role, has been the subject of much criticism for being too optimistic. Indeed, in general games, natural play need not converge to Nash equilibria. In games with multiple equilibria, it is unclear how players are expected to coordinate; even in games with a unique equilibrium, finding it may involve unreasonable expectations on player communication or computation.

Additional Information

© 2011 ACM. Katrina Ligett's work was supported in part by NSF grants 0937060 and DMS-1004416. Georgios Piliouras' work was supported by NSF grants CCF-0325453, AF-0910940, AFOSR grant FA9550-09-1-0420 and ONR grant N00014-09-1-0751.

Additional details

Created:
August 19, 2023
Modified:
October 20, 2023