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Published January 2019 | public
Journal Article

Game of Duels: Information-Theoretic Axiomatization of Scoring Rules

Abstract

This paper aims to develop the insights into Bayesian truth serum (BTS) mechanism by postulating a sequence of seven natural conditions reminiscent of axioms in information theory. The condition that reduces a larger family of mechanisms to BTS is additivity, akin to the axiomatic development of entropy. The seven conditions identify BTS as the unique scoring rule for ranking respondents in situations in which respondents are asked to choose an alternative from a finite set and provide predictions of their peers' propensities to choose, for finite or infinite sets of respondents.

Additional Information

© 2017 IEEE. Manuscript received March 26, 2016; revised August 13, 2018; accepted August 13, 2018. Date of publication August 30, 2018; date of current version December 19, 2018. J. Cvitanić was supported by NSF under Grant DMS 10-08219. S. Radas was supported by the Marie Curie International Outgoing Fellowship through the 7th European Community Framework Programme under Grant PIOF-GA-2013-622868 - BayInno. H. Šikić was supported in part by MZOS, Croatia, under Grant 037-372790-2799 and in part by the Croatian Science Foundation under Project 3526. This paper was presented in part at the 2017 Bayesian Crowd Workshop.

Additional details

Created:
August 19, 2023
Modified:
October 18, 2023