Network Games
Abstract
In contexts ranging from public goods provision to information collection, a player's well-being depends on his or her own action as well as on the actions taken by his or her neighbours. We provide a framework to analyse such strategic interactions when neighbourhood structure, modelled in terms of an underlying network of connections, affects payoffs. In our framework, individuals are partially informed about the structure of the social network. The introduction of incomplete information allows us to provide general results characterizing how the network structure, an individual's position within the network, the nature of games (strategic substitutes vs. complements and positive vs. negative externalities) and the level of information shape individual behaviour and payoffs.
Additional Information
© 2010 The Review of Economic Studies Limited. First version received October 2007; final version accepted February 2009 (Eds.) We thank the editor and three anonymous referees for useful suggestions. We are also grateful to Willemien Kets and a number of seminar audiences for comments which significantly improved the quality and broadened the scope of the paper. Jackson gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Center for Advanced Studies in the Behavior Sciences, the Guggenheim Foundation and the NSF under grant SES-0647867. Vega-Redondo gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Education under grant SEJ2007-62656.Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 88779
- DOI
- 10.1111/j.1467-937x.2009.00570.x
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20180813-091037147
- Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences
- John Simon Guggenheim Foundation
- SES-0647867
- NSF
- SEJ2007-62656
- Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia (MEC)
- Created
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2018-08-13Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2021-11-16Created from EPrint's last_modified field