Published May 2012
| public
Journal Article
Pure strategy Nash equilibria in non-zero sum colonel Blotto games
Abstract
We analyze a Colonel Blotto game in which opposing parties have differing relative intensities. In other words, the game is non-zero sum because colonels have asymmetric and heterogeneous battlefield valuations. We characterize the colonels' payoffs that sustain a pure strategy equilibrium and present an algorithm that reaches the equilibrium actions (when they exist). Finally we show that the set of games with a pure strategy equilibria is non-empty.
Additional Information
© Springer-Verlag 2011. Accepted: 25 May 2011 / Published online: 18 June 2011. We thank Antonio Cabrales, Tom Palfrey, Antoni Rubi and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. Formerly SSWP 1335.Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 83770
- DOI
- 10.1007/s00182-011-0288-4
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20171208-160257129
- Created
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2017-12-20Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2021-11-15Created from EPrint's last_modified field