Published April 1999
| Submitted
Working Paper
Open
The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework
- Creators
-
Camerer, Colin F.
- Hogarth, Robin M.
Chicago
Abstract
We review 74 experiments with no, low, or high performance-based financial incentives. The modal result has no effect on mean performance (though variance is usually reduced by higher payment). Higher incentive does improve performance often, typically judgment tasks that are responsive to better effort. Incentives also reduce "presentation" effects (e.g., generosity and risk-seeking). Incentive effects are comparable to effects of other variables, particularly "cognitive capital" and task "production" demands, and interact with those variables, so a narrow-minded focus on incentives alone is misguided. We also note that no replicated study has made rationality violations disappear purely by raising incentives.
Additional Information
Very helpful comments were received from Baruch Fischhoff, Reid Hastie, John Kagel, Daniel Kahneman, George Loewenstein, Rob MacCoun, Chuck Manski, Richard Thaler, two anonymous referees, and many participants in the NSF/Berkeley Econometrics Lab conference on elicitation of preferences, July/August 1997. Angela Hung provided meticulous research assistance. Published as Camerer, Colin F. and Hogarth, Robin M. (1999) The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 19 (1-3). pp. 7-42.Attached Files
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 83580
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20171129-161418280
- Created
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2017-11-30Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 1059