Published April 1992
| public
Journal Article
A dominant strategy double auction
- Creators
- McAfee, R. Preston
Abstract
A double auction mechanism that provides dominant strategies for both buyers and sellers is analyzed. This mechanism satisfies the 1n convergence to efficiency of the buyer's bid double auction. In addition, the mechanism always produces full information first best prices; the inefficiency arises because the least valuable profitable trade may be prohibited by the mechanism. The mechanism has an oral implementation utilizing bid and asked prices.
Additional Information
© 1992 Academic Press, Inc. Received November 19, 1990; revised June 11, 1991. I benefited from discussions with Kim Border, Mark Satterthwaite, and Sanjay Srivastava, the comments of Steve Williams, and from the advice of Martin Hellwig and two anonymous referees. Formerly SSWP 734.Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 83559
- DOI
- 10.1016/0022-0531(92)90091-U
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20171128-171012049
- Created
-
2017-11-29Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2021-11-15Created from EPrint's last_modified field