Welcome to the new version of CaltechAUTHORS. Login is currently restricted to library staff. If you notice any issues, please email coda@library.caltech.edu
Published April 1992 | public
Journal Article

A dominant strategy double auction

Abstract

A double auction mechanism that provides dominant strategies for both buyers and sellers is analyzed. This mechanism satisfies the 1n convergence to efficiency of the buyer's bid double auction. In addition, the mechanism always produces full information first best prices; the inefficiency arises because the least valuable profitable trade may be prohibited by the mechanism. The mechanism has an oral implementation utilizing bid and asked prices.

Additional Information

© 1992 Academic Press, Inc. Received November 19, 1990; revised June 11, 1991. I benefited from discussions with Kim Border, Mark Satterthwaite, and Sanjay Srivastava, the comments of Steve Williams, and from the advice of Martin Hellwig and two anonymous referees. Formerly SSWP 734.

Additional details

Created:
August 20, 2023
Modified:
October 17, 2023