Published August 1979
| public
Journal Article
Representations of binary decision rules by generalized decisiveness structures
- Creators
- Ferejohn, John A.
- Fishburn, Peter C.
Abstract
This paper is motivated by two apparently dissimilar deficiencies in the theory of social choice and the theory of cooperative games. Both deficiencies stem from what we regard as an inadequate conception of decisiveness or coalitional power. Our main purpose will be to present a more general concept of decisiveness and to show that this notion allows us to characterize broad classes of games and social choice procedures.
Additional Information
© 1979 Academic Press. Received July 28, 1977. Formerly SSWP 168.Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 83413
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20171121-154516353
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2017-11-22Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field