Published 1980
| public
Journal Article
An analysis of fully distributed cost pricing in regulated industries
- Creators
- Braeutigam, Ronald R.
Chicago
An error occurred while generating the citation.
Abstract
This paper examines the economic consequences of allocating common costs by (1) gross revenues, (2) directly attributable costs, and (3) relative output levels (such as ton-miles) to determine fully distributed cost prices for regulated firms. The analysis characterizes FDC tariffs by examining the nature of the economic inefficiency associated with the rules and explains how opportunities for entry by unregulated firms might change if Ramsey optimal pricing were used instead of FDC pricing.
Additional Information
© 1980 RAND Corporation. This research was supported at the California Institute of Technology, in part under a DOE grant, EY-76-G-03-1305, EQL Block. I wish to thank the Environmental Quality Laboratory at the California Institute of Technology for its assistance in this work. I would also like to thank James Quirk, Roger Noll, F.M. Scherer, the Editorial Board, and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments on an earlier draft. Formerly SSWP 270.Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 83365
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20171120-154022972
- Department of Energy (DOE)
- EY-76-G-03-1305
- Created
-
2017-11-21Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2021-11-15Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Environmental Quality Laboratory