A formal theory of lobbying behavior
- Creators
- Reinganum, Jennifer F.
Abstract
This paper analyses strategic lobbying behaviour under the assumption of disorganized opposition. A dynamic programming approach is used. The optimal rate of lobbying expenditure is shown to be an increasing function of time. A specific example is computed to determine the influence of various parameters. Next, the case of lobbying against an active counterlobby is considered in a dynamic game-theoretic framework. The Nash equilibrium rates of lobbying expenditure are computed for a specific example with symmetric players. The equilibrium rates of expenditure for the two lobbyists may be either everywhere increasing, everywhere decreasing, or single peaked as a function of time. In addition, some comparative statics results are reversed relative to those of the disorganized opposition model.
Additional Information
© 1983 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Received 14 July 1982. Formerly SSWP 302Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 83361
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20171120-150131003
- Created
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2017-11-20Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2021-11-15Created from EPrint's last_modified field