Published July 1984
| Published
Journal Article
Open
Continuum and finite-player noncooperative models of competition
- Creators
- Green, Edward J.
Abstract
The anonymous interaction of large numbers of economic agents is a kind of noncooperative situation which is markedly different from small-numbers strategic conflict. The nonatomic game has been introduced as a model for these many-agent situations. This paper contains a precise definition of what it means for a nonatomic game to be the limit of a sequence of finite-player games, and a theorem which states when the limit of equilibria of finite-player games will be an equilibrium of the nonatomic limit game. This is analogous to theorems prompted by Edgeworth's conjecture in core theory.
Additional Information
© 1984 The Econometric Society. I would like to thank Marcus Berliant, Donald Brown, Tatsuro Ichiishi, Ariel Rubenstein, Hugo Sonnenschein, and an anonymous referee for their comments and suggestions. Formerly SSWP 418.Attached Files
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 83262
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20171116-142209931
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2017-11-16Created from EPrint's datestamp field
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2021-11-15Created from EPrint's last_modified field