Published June 1986
| public
Journal Article
The scope of the hypothesis of Bayesian equilibrium
- Creators
- Ledyard, John O.
Abstract
What behavior can be explained as the Bayes equilibrium of some game? The main finding is-almost anything. Given any Bayesian (coordination) game with positive priors, and given any vector of nondominated strategies. there is an increasing transformation of each utility function such that the given vector of strategies is a Bayes (Nash) equilibrium of the transformed game. Any nondominated behavior can be rationalized as Bayes equilibrium behavior. Some comments on the implications of these results for game theory are included.
Additional Information
© 1986 Academic Press, Inc. Received October 29, 1984; revised February 4, 1986. This paper is an extensive revision of one presented in the Theory workshop at Caltech and at the Institute for Mathematics and Its Applications at the University of Minnesota. I thank both sets of participants for their suggestions and comments. I especially thank Kim Border and Charles Plott who asked the right questions at the right times. The revision of the first version has benefited from the insightful and careful comments of Steve Matthews, Mark Satterthwaite, Robert Wilson, and a good referee. Finally, I thank the intransigent referee of Easley and Ledyard, whose misguided refusal to consider the behavior proposed in that as reasonable led me to the research reported here. Formerly SSWP 532.Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 83192
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20171114-133240240
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2017-11-15Created from EPrint's datestamp field
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2021-11-15Created from EPrint's last_modified field