Published March 1, 1985
| public
Journal Article
A note on taxation, development, and representative government
- Creators
- Bates, Robert H.
- Lien, Da-Hsiang Donald
Abstract
Revenue-seeking governments may well find it to their advantage to strike bargains with citizens whose assets they seek to tax. To induce a greater willingness to pay taxes, they may defer to the citizens' policy preferences. Such bargains may become more beneficial from the citizens' point of view the more mobile the assets the citizens hold. These claims form the central themes of this paper.
Additional Information
© 1985 SAGE. Research for this article was supported by The National Science Foundation (Grant no. SES82-16870). Our special thanks to Philip Hoffman. Formerly SSWP 567.Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 83169
- DOI
- 10.1177/003232928501400102
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20171113-153938001
- SES82-16870
- NSF
- Created
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2017-11-15Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2021-11-15Created from EPrint's last_modified field