Published December 1987
| public
Journal Article
Sophisticated sincerity: Voting over endogenous agendas
- Creators
- Austen-Smith, David
Abstract
The empirical findings on whether or not legislators vote strategically are mixed. This is at least partly due to the fact that to establish any hypothesis on strategic voting, legislators' preferences need to be known, and these are typically private data. I show that under complete information, if decision making is by the amendment procedure and if the agenda is set endogenously, then sophisticated (strategic) voting over the resulting agenda is observationally equivalent to sincere voting. The voting strategies, however, are sophisticated. This fact has direct implications for empirical work on sophisticated voting.
Additional Information
© 1987 American Political Science Association. I am grateful to Richard McKelvey for comments on an earlier version of this paper. They bear no responsibility for any remaining shortcomings. This research is supported by NSF grant SES-8600965. Formerly SSWP 630Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 83127
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20171110-134842995
- SES-8600965
- NSF
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2017-11-16Created from EPrint's datestamp field
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2021-11-15Created from EPrint's last_modified field