Published November 10, 2007
| public
Journal Article
Envy-freeness and implementation in large economies
- Creators
-
Jackson, Matthew O.
- Kremer, Ilan
Chicago
Abstract
We show that an asymptotic envy-freeness condition is necessary for a form of robust approximate implementation in large economies. In settings where allocations are excludable, asymptotic envy-freeness is also sufficient for implementation, while in non-excludable settings it is not sufficient.
Additional Information
© Springer-Verlag 2007. Published online: 10 January 2007. We are grateful for financial support from the National Science Foundation under grants SES-9986190 and SES-0316493. We thank Laurent Mathevet, Andy Postlewaite, Muhamet Yildiz, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments on earlier drafts. We dedicate this paper to Murat Sertel, with fond memories of his engaging personality, warm friendship, and wide-ranging contributions to economic theory. Formerly SSWP 1157.Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 82966
- DOI
- 10.1007/s10058-006-0011-2
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20171103-163054345
- NSF
- SES-9986190
- NSF
- SES-0316493
- Created
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2017-11-06Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2021-11-15Created from EPrint's last_modified field