Published February 2012
| Submitted + Published
Journal Article
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Contracts versus Salaries in Matching
- Creators
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Echenique, Federico
Abstract
Firms and workers may sign complex contracts that govern many aspects of their interactions. I show that when firms regard contracts as substitutes, bargaining over contracts can be understood as bargaining only over wages. Substitutes is the assumption commonly used to guarantee the existence of stable matchings of workers and firms.
Additional Information
© 2012 American Economic Association. I thank Vince Crawford, Flip Klijn, Scott Kominers, and Michael Ostrovsky for very useful comments. I am also very grateful to three anonymous referees for their thoughtful questions and suggestions.Attached Files
Published - sswp1322_-_published.pdf
Submitted - Contracts_vs._Salaries_in_Matching-Preprint.pdf
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Contracts_vs._Salaries_in_Matching-Preprint.pdf
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 82923
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20171102-165954225
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2017-11-03Created from EPrint's datestamp field
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2021-11-15Created from EPrint's last_modified field