Published November 2, 2017
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Patent Policy, Technological Innovation, and Government Contracts: A Selective Critique
Abstract
In traditional economics, the patent system has rested on a twofold justification: 1) The award of a temporary monopoly to the creator of an invention will induce investment in inventive activity; 2) Given such a temporary monopoly, the inventor will make his invention public knowledge. Numerous writers have treated the first assertion, and a few have considered the second. But there is also a general welfare question to be considered: Is society better off with a patent system than without one?
Additional Information
Published in Government Policies and Technological Innovatio, National Technical Information Service. National Science Foundation, Washington, D.C. 20550. Vol. II, p. 23-51, State-of-the-Art Surveys, PB244572/AS, 1974.Attached Files
Submitted - sswp56.pdf
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sswp56.pdf
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 82850
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20171101-144643147
- Created
-
2017-11-02Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 56