Published September 1976
| Submitted
Working Paper
Open
Monopoly and the Rate of Extraction of Exhaustible Resources: Note
Chicago
Abstract
The contention that a monopolist exhausts a natural resource at a slower than socially optimal rate is examined for two cases: (1) fixed operation costs; and (2) demand elasticity increasing with output. Under either or both of these assumptions, monopoly extraction rates may be biased in the opposite direction towards excessive resource use. On balance, it is concluded, the effect of monopoly ownership on relative extraction rates must be determined empirically. Furthermore we suggest that the addition of fixed costs into the analysis will tend to destroy the Pareto optimal properties of resource extraction under competitive conditions.
Additional Information
The authors wish to thank Jim Quirk and Vernon Smith for thoughtful comments and suggestions in preparing this note. Financial assistance from the Ford Foundation and ERDA is gratefully acknowledged. Published as Lewis, Tracy R., Steven A. Matthews, and H. Stuart Burness. "Monopoly and the rate of extraction of exhaustible resources: Note." The American Economic Review 69.1 (1979): 227-230.Attached Files
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 82715
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20171026-151457292
- Created
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2017-10-27Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 137