Democratic Exploitation of a Non-Replenishable Resource
- Creators
- Burness, H. Stuart
- Lewis, Tracy R.
Abstract
In a recent article, Neher (1976) suggests an interesting democratic process for allocating a scarce, renewable natural resource among different generations. The procedure is characterized by a) continuous voting, b) one person--one vote, c) unsophisticated voting, and d) simple majority rule, and determines the length of the optimal exploitation plan in a society of overlapping generations. Allocations resulting from this plan are revealed to be unjust in the "Rawlsian" sense as the selfishness of living voters is reflected in current decisions. We adopt the same procedure to determine the allocation of a nonrenewable resource under democratic exploitation. With continuous democratic voting, plans are continuously revised and resources are forever being consumed at a rate which is a constant proportion of the total resource available. As before, democratic exploitation of the resource is unjust in the Rawlsian sense: succeeding generations are given smaller allocations of the resource.
Additional Information
Research support from the Energy Research Development Association, Grant No. EX-76-G-03-1305, California Institute of Technology Energy Research Program is gratefully acknowledged. The authors wish to thank James Quirk and Louis Wilde for valuable comments.Attached Files
Submitted - sswp161.pdf
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 82670
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20171025-141717561
- Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA)
- EX-76-G-03-1305
- Caltech Energy Research Program
- Created
-
2017-10-25Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 161