Published October 27, 2017
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A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional Norms
- Creators
- Weingast, Barry R.
Abstract
This paper presents a modification of the theory of the legislature which retains the assumption of self-interested maximizing behavior, but yields predictions consistent with empirical observation. In addition, this perspective suggests rationales for other features of Congress that are commonly reported in the empirical literature: the existence of various "norms," "roles," and "expectations."
Additional Information
I am grateful to Robert Bates, John Ferejohn, Morris Fiorina, James Quirk, and Roger Noll for helpful comments at the various stages of this paper. Published as Weingast, Barry R. "A rational choice perspective on congressional norms." American Journal of Political Science (1979): 245-262.Attached Files
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Additional details
- Eprint ID
- 82668
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20171025-140543064
- Created
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2017-10-27Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 142